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Abstract
This paper criticizes the view that discrimination limits the disadvantaged
sex to undertaking housework and thus ensures that gains from specializa-
tion at the household level are not wasted. Our framework gives attention to
causal links between labor market discrimination and the strategic behavior
of women and men within families. We consider a repeated family bargaining
model that links the topics of employment and households. A key aspect of
the model is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously: the
amount of money a person earns—in comparison with a partner’s income—
establishes relative marital bargaining power. Gender discrimination can alter
household behavior in surprising and sometimes unfortunate ways. We show
that: (i) the efficiency of household decisions is sometimes inversely related to
the prevailing degree of gender discrimination in labor markets; (ii) discrimi-
nated against females have difficulty enforcing cooperative household outcomes
since they may be extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior
by their male partners; (iii) the likelihood that sharing rules such as “equal
sharing” are maintained throughout a marriage relationship is highest when
men and women face equal opportunities in labor markets. A key policy im-
plication obtained from our analysis is that efforts to promote greater gender
equality in labor markets can also contribute to increasing the likelihood of
fully cooperative outcomes at the household level.
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utation.
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“Would it ever be optimal for a welfare-maximizing government, to wish to
end discrimination? ... By restricting access to good jobs, a discrimination
equilibrium limits the discriminated against sex to undertaking housework ...
and thus ensures that household-specific human capital is not wasted.” [Patrick
Francois, Journal of Public Economics, 1998].
“...two persons of cultivated faculties, identical in opinions and purposes, be-
tween whom there exists that best of equality, similarity of powers and capac-
ities ...This and this only is the ideal of marriage; ... all opinions, customs
and institutions which favor any other notion of it ... are relics of primitive
barbarism.” [John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, 1869].
1 Introduction
Although equality between women and men has been firmly recognized as a pri-
ority issue by the world’s governments,1 concerns about biased work practices and
public policies are still raised at different levels. Differential wages and payment
rates constitute one important part of gender discrimination in most societies, and
there are many other spheres of differential benefits. For example, in opportunities
for promotion and achievement;2 in institutional characteristics of the labor mar-
ket such as liberties to enter certain employment arrangements; but also in public
policies such as the tax treatment of families.3 The situation today from a policy
point of view is thus a split one. On the one hand, fundamental antidiscrimina-
tion principles embedded in equal employment opportunity laws (EEO’s) seek to
create a framework within which women can compete with men on equal footing.
On the other hand, EEO’s are still subject to vigorous debate over whether their
perceived benefits outweigh the associated regulatory and efficiency costs, with the
consequence that unequal outcomes are perpetuated.
The debates about existing policies against gender discrimination is a subset of a
broader issue: Why does gender discrimination exist as an equilibrium phenomenon
in competitive labor markets? Can we explain the persistence of discrimination as
arising from inherent asymmetries between men and women? We enter this broad
debate with what we take to be an important issue. To begin, many economists
contend that women’s increased employment over the past few decade has reduced
the joint gain from marriage because when wives are employed there is less special-
ization within families and such specialization increases joint gain (Becker et al.,
1See, for example, United Nations Human Development Report (1995).
2For example, the ‘glass ceiling’ restricting women’s career and development prospects, in par-
ticular their seniority and responsibility, remains firmly in place (Blau and Ehrenberg, 1997); In
addition, even if women are as likely as men to be promoted, they often find themselves at the
bottom of the wage scale for the new grade (Booth et al., 2002).
3
Joint taxation systems tax both family members at the same rate. That joint taxation may
lead to differential treatment of men and women—by lowering the tax rate of the high-earner which
occurs at the expense of an increase in the marginal rate of the low-earner—is well understood.
With individual taxation, the low-earner is taxed at a lower-rate than the high earner. For a
insightful discussion of tax systems across Europe and elsewhere see O’Donoghue and Sutherland
(1998).
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1977; Becker, 1991). Motivated by this thought-provoking argument, this paper ad-
dresses the following questions: Is it in ‘society’s’ interest to sustain discrimination
as a means of discouraging women from entering work and supporting the division
of labor within families (and thus, presumably, ensuring that no household-specific
human capital is wasted)? Or, can we theoretically account for the possibility
that the ‘joint gain’ from marriage increases even as specialization decreases within
marriage?
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of labor market discrim-
ination on the economic roles of women and men within families. In doing so, we
provide the first fully developed treatment of the claim that the full impact of gen-
der discrimination also includes feedback effects on women’s and men’s strategic
behavior within the household. We show that an assessment of this continuous un-
derlying feedback effect is a key aspect in the analysis and formulation of policies,
programs and initiatives targeted at gender differences. There are, of course, many
channels through which gender-specific labor market trends may impinge on family
decision-making. The finer points of this paper focus on how gender discrimination
affects market and non-market decisions by women and men, intra-household bar-
gaining, household distributional outcomes, and the degree of cooperation that can
be sustained within families.
To address these issues, we develop a repeated-game model of family bargain-
ing that links household and labor market decisions. A key aspect of the one-shot
(constituent) game is that marital bargaining power is determined endogenously:
the amount of money a person earns—in comparison with a partner’s income—
establishes relative bargaining power inside the family. This introduces a non-
cooperative element to the couple’s decision-making problem since both partners
anticipate how their labor market decisions affect their marital bargaining power
and the share they can extract from family resources. This sets up a two-stage
decision problem. At the first stage each family member non-cooperatively chooses
an investment in his or her individual earning power, while bargaining between the
family members at stage 2 forms the basis of the allocation of time between labor
market work and contributions to a household public good. The investment deci-
sion at stage 1 is to be interpreted broadly—for example, an ‘on-the-job’ effort or
a career investment such as the commitment to work odd hours. It is shown that,
introducing these dynamics result in strategic manoeuvreing by men and women,
which traps the household in inefficient situations. There are two deviations from
the first-best here: women’s and men’s participation in the world outside the family
gives them power bases in family bargains based on income contributions. Antic-
ipating this, they will overinvest in market activities in the first place. However,
the personal gains (in terms of bargaining power) each family member makes by
overinvesting in market activities are apparently lost at the level of collective con-
tributions to domestic public goods, which are chosen inefficiently low. Thus, in our
constituent game, there is a separation between the incentives motivating individual
family members and the rewards of collective cooperation.
Given the above observation, we examine how gender-specific labor market
trends affect investments, household public good provisions and welfare of a fam-
ily in the equilibrium of the constituent game. Strikingly, in this environment,
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gender discrimination in the labor market generally enhances aggregate household
outcomes. The basic argument for this point runs as follows. If family public
goods are under provided, then discrimination serves the role of imposing unequal
(marginal) returns on individuals of opposite sex in order to reallocate their in-
centives according to their comparative contribution efficiencies. The ‘gender gap’
acts as a disincentive to work, pushes women towards greater specialization in the
household sphere, and supports traditional family arrangements. We show that
total time contribution to the domestic public increases since the female devotes
less time to the labor market. As a consequence, discrimination can be seen as a
force that shifts family decision-making closer to the first-best efficient household
equilibrium than it would be without discrimination.
It is also shown, however, that the one-shot interactions are characterized by
an efficiency-equality trade off: subjecting women to greater inequality in the labor
market, which, in turn, implies less involvement with outside work and paid employ-
ment, does tend to go with greater anti-female bias in intra-family distributions.
In other words, the very presence of gender discrimination in the labor market may
result in a ‘Kuznets effect’ at the micro level of intra-household resource allocations:
households become better off; but better households become more unequal.
So, in the constituent game, gender discrimination is an exogenous force that
deters socially costly but privately beneficial overinvestments in market activities
or, put differently, it alleviates an collective action (or holdup) problem that arises
among marital partners. However, when the spouses interact repeatedly over time,
then the desirability of exogenous forces such as the “gender gap” does not only
depend on the existence of a (socially costly) holdup problem within the family. It
also depends on the way informal agreements between spouses regarding marital
behavior already address the holdup problem and the extent to which environmental
parameters would interfere with those informal agreements. In the second part of
the paper, we therefore examine the repeated-game version of the constituent game.
We are particularly interested in questions of when and how a couple can a achieve
an efficient household equilibrium in a self-enforcing manner. One way to do this is
for the family members to agree in advance to cooperate, with the efficient outcome
being sustained by the threat that if one partner deviates then immediately ‘play’
proceeds according to the inefficient constituent game.
A key issue that separates the constituent game from the repeated-game model is
whether environmental parameters (including wage and employment opportunities
of each family member) matter for men’s and women’s incentives to cooperate. One
of the fundamental insights that we obtain is that if the family members are identical
in every respect — that is, they have identical market and non-market skills and
face equal opportunities in the labor market — then reputational forces are most
likely to work: in such circumstances, the efficient outcome can be sustained for
the widest set of possible parameter values. However, if the family members are
different in some respects (e.g., if there is a ‘gender gap’ in pay or occupational
status), then there exists a conflict in the partners’ incentives cooperate. For,
in such circumstances, the shifting balance of power within the family makes the
dominant partner more likely to demand a renegotiation of the arrangement that
sustains the first-best after the marriage has begun.
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What this suggests in the face of anti female-discrimination policy is the fol-
lowing: whatever the consequences of such policy elsewhere in society, our model
predicts that it will be successful in promoting more balanced power arrangements
inside families. This, in turn, implies that women’s and men’s incentives to coop-
erate are at a medium level, rather than one’s being very strong but the other’s
being very weak. Thus, efforts to promote greater gender equality in the labor
market can create the conditions for first-best efficient household equilibria to be
sustainable in the long-run, by essentially increasing the degree of cooperation that
can be sustained within families. This result motivates a new perspective on family
policy in general: a major factor in the policy-making process should be whether
policies targeted at families facilitate cooperation within households.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section explains
how the paper relates to the literature. Section 3 lays down our baseline model
and studies its unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. The repeated game
is studied in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implications of the theory. A brief
conclusion is contained in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two literatures. As a contribution to the economics of
discrimination, it adds to the body of work investigating theoretically gender dis-
crimination and its dimensions. Economists working in this area have generally
focused on explaining the existence of gender discrimination in competitive labor
markets. Becker’s (1971) ‘taste-for-discrimination model’ describes discrimination
as a preference for which the discriminator is willing to pay. Signalling theories
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1982; Milgrom and Oster, 1987) explain discrimination as
arising due to differences in the noise of productivity signals across gender. A final
broad category of explanations arises from crowding theories of occupational segre-
gation (Bergman, 1971; Arrow, 1973) which explore the consequences of confining
women to a limited number of occupations.4
Theoretically, our paper is new primarily in emphasizing two levels of integration
that we have found missing in previous studies. First, we integrate the topics of
employment and households, pointing to discrimination against women in labor
markets as affecting the division of labor at home and the way men and women
behave on the job. Second, we provide a framework that gives attention to causal
links between the relative position of men and women in employment and intra-
household bargaining and power arrangements. Interest in this area is explained by
the fact that an assessment of this continuous underlying feedback effect is a key
aspect in the analysis and formulation of policies, programs and initiatives targeted
at gender differences. The papers most similar in spirit to ours are Iyigun and
Walsh (2002) and Dessy and Pallage (2003). Iyigun and Walsh’s (2002) simulation
4More recently, Francois (1998), provides a rationale for the continued existence of gender
discrimination which arises from the intra-household trade between men. This theory posits that
firms can ensure that all of its employees are ‘non-shirkers’ if they do not have spouses in good
jobs. As a consequence, firms should reserve good jobs for males exclusively.
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of a family behavior model predicts that empowering women through institutional
reform leads to lower fertility and higher educational attainment. Our framework
is different from theirs, although some of the issues we are interested in are similar.
Dessy and Pallage (2003) show that if women have a credible outside option to
marriage (such as the right to start their own business) then gender discrimination
is likely to disappear.
Our approach to modelling discrimination envisions a discrimination coeffi-
cient which measures social and cultural attitudes towards gender inequality. The
strength of this coefficient reduces the ability of the discriminated group to trans-
form market skills and market time into incremental earnings. This aspect of the
theory allows us to use nondiscrimination as a benchmark and to compare it with
discriminatory labor market practices. The discrimination coefficient that we use
to explain the feedback effect of sex discrimination on household outcomes is re-
lated to Becker’s (1971) “taste-for-discrimination model” and to Iyigun and Walsh’s
(2002) “endogenous household bargaining power model”. It should be emphasized,
however, that, for the most part, the feedback effects to be discussed apply to other
prominent explanations of gender discrimination such as signalling-based theories
or segmented labor market theories.
The paper also contributes to the theoretical literature on household behav-
ior. The theoretical approach taken here can be seen as part of the ‘incomplete-
contracting’ approach to modelling family behavior. This strand of research ex-
plores the implications of the inability of family members to ‘commit across time’—
inability which typically leads to inefficient household outcomes. Recent family be-
havior models which have the feature of constraint efficiency include Konrad and
Lommerud (2000), Lundberg and Pollak (2001), Vagstad (2001), Basu (2001) and
Rainer (2003). The common feature of these models is that they set aside the ruling
tradition in family economics that household are able to reach efficient outcomes.5
Konrad and Lommerud’s (2000) family behavior model is most closely related
to the present one. There are, however, three important differences between this
paper and theirs. First, while Konrad and Lommerud (2000) focus on symmetric
market and non-market decisions by males and females, a key point of the present
paper is that these decisions may be asymmetric across gender. Second, this paper
explores in great detail the impact of gender-specific labor market trends on fam-
ily welfare and household distributional outcomes. The third difference is that we
specify how family members can overcome inefficient situations and reach efficient
household resource allocations that are implicitly enforced through reputational
forces. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) instead propose a ‘static’ model in that the
spouses are determining their relationship after one period. While the likely im-
portance of reputational forces within households has been mentioned by numerous
5By contrast, most models of household behavior assume as a rule that families are able to reach
efficient outcomes. For example, “the common preference approach” (Becker 1991), the “collective
approach” (Chiappori 1992; Chiappori et al. 2002) and Nash bargaining models of the family
(Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981; McElroy 1990) work with this assumption.
For an insightful survey see Lundberg and Pollak (1996).
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authors,6 the theoretical argument has not previously been developed.7 Hence, the
present paper could be viewed as a way of reconciling family models of constraint
efficiency and models of the household that merely assume efficiency.
3 The Model
In this section we present a simple model of a dual-breadwinner household. The
household is comprised of two decision-makers, one male (m) and one female ( f).
Time is divided into an infinite number of periods t = 1, 2, ...,∞. In each period, the
household resource allocation is made in two stages. We will refer to this two-stage
game as the constituent game. In the first stage, each family member invests in his
or her individual earning power, anticipating the impact this decision will have on
the intra-household balance of power. In the second stage, the couple determine
the allocation of time to household production through bargaining. Market work
produces a pure private good for each person, whereas time spent at home produces
a pure household public good. We have chosen the pure private good—pure public
good formulation as a benchmark. We now present the specific assumptions in each
stage of the base model.
A. Timing of the Constituent Game
Individuals must be proactive to be ‘successful’ in the labor market. At the be-
ginning of stage 1 each agent of gender i, i ∈ {f, m}, simultaneously and non-
cooperatively chooses an investment in his or her individual earning power. This
investment is to be interpreted broadly—it could be, for example, a career invest-
ment such as the commitment to work odd hours and not taking leaves in connection
with household duties. We model agent i’s career investment as a continuous deci-
sion: let wi ∈ [0, w] denote the investment of agent i. The cost to agent i of putting
in effort wi at work is measured by a strictly increasing and strictly convex cost
function β(wi). After choice of his or her career strategy, agent i’s labor market
wage rate is equal to wi. We assume that agents choose their career strategies by
anticipating the impact this decision will have in the bargaining stage, in particular
on the relative bargaining positions inside the household.
At the beginning of stage 2, the career investments wf and wm are observed
by the individuals, and the couple bargain over the levels of their time contributions
to the household public good gf and gm, respectively. The amount of the household
public good is public in the sense that the payoffs that it generates are non-rival
and non-excludable. In each period, both agents are endowed with one unit of
time, gi ∈ [0, 1], which they allocate between market work and providing a home-
produced family good. The family good that we have in mind is the time spent
caring for children. The psychic cost attached to such a time contribution is bi(gi).
6See, for example, Becker (1991), Konrad and Lommerud (1995), Lundberg (2002), and Rainer
(2003).
7A notable exeption is the paper by Bernheim and Stark (1988). Using a repeated model of
marriage, they criticize the view that altruism improves the allocation of resources within the
family.
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As in Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000), we adopt
the Nash bargaining solution to describe the outcome of the bargaining process at
stage 2, in which the “fall-back” position comprises a non-cooperative contribution
equilibrium at that stage.
Our dynamic model represents the infinite repetition of the two-stage game
outlined above. We adopt the simplifying assumption that career efforts as well
as contributions at home fully depreciate before the next period begins. While
potentially restrictive, it allows to focus on a model that is already sufficiently rich.
B. Preferences
Firms buy a package of time and effort from each individual, with payment tied
to the package rather than rendered separately for units of time and effort. The
household public good is produced with a constant returns technology, i.e., output
of a domestic good is proportional to time input. Agents derive utility from a
purely private good and from a household public good. As will be now seen, the
term ‘gender’ in our model refers to the home productivities and labor market
opportunities associated with being male and female. The payoff function of agent
i is:
ui = θiwi(1− gi) + G− γib(gi)− β(wi), for i ∈ {f, m} (1)
We would like to elaborate on this payoff formulation. The first term in the above
equation reflects individual earnings implied by career effort wi and time spent at
work 1 − gi. We refer to the parameter θi in more detail below. The second term
represents the amount of a household public good:
G = gf + gm.
Each agent i directly chooses his or her time contribution gi, the cost of which is
captured by b(gi). We assume that b (gi) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in
gi, that is, b
′ (gi) > 0 and b
′′ (gi). We further assume that women and men can have
different (psychic) costs of providing the public good, measured by the individual-
specific parameter γi, with the resulting contribution cost γib (gi). The parameter
γi reflects i’s contribution productivity at home: family members i’s capacity to
contribute to the household good (childcare) is high when both total and marginal
cost (as captured by γi) for any level of time input is low. A first major aspect
of our analysis is to entertain intrinsic differences between the sexes’ contribution
productivities.
Assumption 1 γf < γm.
Analytically, the assumption implies that women have a (possibly small) com-
parative advantage in home production over men.8 The distinguishing feature of
8There exists a strong biological basis for this assumption. Our specification captures the idea
that women have a relatively strong commitment to the care of children because they want their
heavy biological investment in production up until birth to be worthwhile (Triver, 1972, Wright,
1994). Men are typically less biologically committed to the care of children (Becker, 1991). It is well
understood that these biological differences lead to a comparative advantage between the sexes in
the care of children, and perhaps also in other household commodities (due to the complementarity
between rearing children and other types of time use in the household sphere).
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the analysis presented below is to provide a rationale for gender discrimination to
disappear despite inherent differences in comparative advantage between the sexes.
.
C. The Discrimination Coefficient
A second major aspect of the model under study is that we aim to examine the feed-
back effects of gender discrimination on household behavior. We do not attempt to
identify which of the potential causes of discrimination is most relevant, nor do we
take a stand on its microeconomic underpinnings. Instead, we introduce the exoge-
nous coefficients θf and θm to capture the potential asymmetric opportunities of
men and women in the outside labor market, where (θf , θm) ∈ [0, 1]
2.9 In the case
where θf = θm, the labor market opportunities of men and women are the same,
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which we will refer to as the non-discrimination benchmark. We characterize gender
discrimination as a pair of infinitesimal changes in θf and θm in opposite propor-
tional directions. Thus we capture the fact that the term “gender discrimination” in
ordinary usage conflates two mutually connected aspects: negative versus positive
discrimination. Indeed, in our analysis, not only do females suffer directly from dis-
criminatory labor market practices, but such practices make the non-discriminated
group perform better economically relative to the non-discrimination benchmark.
Since we consider an environment where gender discrimination affects the economic
opportunities of men and women in opposite proportional directions, much can be
gained analytically by using the normalization θf ≡ θ and θm ≡ 1 − θ, where
an arbitrary value of θ over the interval [0, 12) is a measure of the propensity to
discriminate against women.11
We now solve the constituent game backwards, considering first the bargaining
equilibrium at stage 2.
D. The Bargaining Equilibrium
We first derive the non-cooperative contribution equilibrium at stage 2. As in
Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and Konrad and Lommerud (2000), we will use this
outcome to derive the NBS in which the non-cooperative equilibrium payoffs are
considered to be the disagreement point. For an arbitrary set of career investments,
(wf , wm), at stage 1, the non-cooperative contribution payoff to person i is given
by
di
(
gni , g
n
j
)
= θiwi (1− g
n
i ) + g
n
i + g
n
j − γib (g
n
i )− β(wi), (2)
were (gni , g
n
j ), i 6= j, are uniquely defined and solve the first order condition
θiwi + γib
′ (gi) = 1 for i ∈ {f, m}. (3)
9An alternative interpretation is also applicable. One can also interpret θf and θm to be inverse
measures of the (potential asymmetric) cost of female and male participation in the labor market.
10Put differently, the rates of return on each level of effort and market time are the same for
men and women
11Iyigun and Walsh (2002) use a similar concept in order to capture gender differences in the labor
market, interpreting the parameter θ as social and cultural attitudes towards gender inequality.
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In the non-cooperative contribution equilibrium, the marginal private cost of spend-
ing extra time at home must equal the marginal private benefit, which equals one.
For future reference note that gni = g
n
i (wi), that is, the allocation of time at stage
2 directly interacts with the allocation of effort at stage 1. At stage 2, the fam-
ily members determine the allocation of time to household production, gf and gm
through bargaining. The non-cooperative contribution equilibrium is important in
defining the disagreement payoffs in the stage 2 bargaining game.
We start by characterizing the husband-wife utility possibility frontier of the
set of feasible payoff pairs that can be reached if an agreement is struck at stage 2.
The Nash bargaining solution picks one point on this frontier. The husband-wife
utility possibility frontier, uf + um ≡ W is given by
W
(
gei , g
e
j
)
=
∑
i=f,m
θiwi (1− g
e
i ) + 2g
e
i − γib (g
e
i )− β(wi), (4)
where (gei , g
e
j ) are the maximizers of joint family welfare. They are uniquely defined
and solve the first order condition
θiwi + γib
′ (gi) = 2 for i ∈ {f, m}. (5)
It is obvious that gei = g
e
i (wi). Notice that the first order conditions for g
n
i and
gei in (3) and (4), respectively, imply that, for an arbitrary wi chosen at stage 1,
gei > g
n
i . That is, the non-cooperative contribution equilibrium at stage 2 suffers
from underprovision of the domestic public good. Of course, this is due to the fact
that the marginal private return from choosing gi (i.e., the right-hand side of (3))
is less than the marginal social return from choosing gi (i.e., the right-hand side of
(5)). As a consequence,
W (gei , g
e
i ) > di(g
n
i , g
n
j ) + dj(g
n
i , g
n
j ),
implying that gains from cooperation at stage 2 do exist. Hence it is Pareto-efficient
for the couple to strike an agreement on how to allocate W (gei , g
e
j ).
Applying the Nash bargaining solution with the non-cooperative contribution
payoffs in (2) as the “fall-back” position, the Nash bargained payoffs to f and m
at stage 2 are determined by the split-the-difference rule:
uNi =
W (gei , g
e
j ) + di(g
n
i , g
n
j )− dj(g
n
i , g
n
j )
2
, (6)
where gei = g
e
i (wi) and g
n
i = g
n
i (wi). This says that each person first of all obtains
a payoff equal to the payoff that she/he obtains in the non-cooperative contribu-
tion equilibrium–and then the remaining surplus from cooperation is split equally
between the spouses.
E. Investment in Individual Earning Powers
Having solved the couple’s bargaining problem at stage 2 (for an arbitrary set
of decisions made at stage 1) we next turn to their on-the-job effort decisions at
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stage 1. As a benchmark, we first work out the first-best effort levels and the
individuals maximize joint surplus. The first-best efforts,(
wei , w
e
j
)
∈ arg max
wi,wj
W
(
gei (wi), g
e
j (wj)
)
,
are the unique maximizers of the ‘household welfare function’ in (4). It is straight-
forward to establish that wei uniquely solves the first-order condition
θi [1− g
e
i (wi)] = β
′
i (wi) for i ∈ {f, m}. (7)
At the social optimum, the marginal social return from spending extra effort at
work must equal the marginal cost of that extra effort.
Consider next the equilibrium value of wi. Career investments wf and wm
are chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively by f and m, respectively. The
equilibrium investment level,
wni = arg max
wi
uNi (g
e
i (wi), g
n
i (wi)) ,
is the unique maximizer of player i’s Nash-bargained payoff in (6). Define (gni )
′ =
∂gni /∂wi. It is now straightforward to establish the following result:
Proposition 1 The constituent game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, family member i (i = f, m) sets wi = w
n
i , where w
n
i is the
unique solution to the first-order condition
1
2
[
θi [2− g
e
i (wi)− g
n
i (wi)]− (g
n
i )
′
]
= β′(wi). (8)
Equilibrium investments are chosen inefficiently high, that is wni > w
e
i . Further-
more, equilibrium public good provisions are inefficiently low, ge (wni ) < g
e (wei ) .
An efficient household resource allocation cannot be achieved.
Proof. See the Appendix.
There are two deviations from first-best here. The first inefficiency that is described
is the inefficiency of strategic over investment in individual earning powers. The
mechanism that induces this excessive investment is a negative bargaining inter-
nality: since the division of the gains from cooperation at stage 2 depend on the
ex post bargaining powers of the spouses, each spouse is led to put half weight on
maximizing his or her relative bargaining position (as captured by the difference
di − dj) when deciding on investments at stage 1. As a consequence, a “rat-race”
equilibrium will result in which career investments are driven to a point where the
sum of individual utilities is decreased. It is worth emphasizing that the second
type of deviation from the first-best that is described here—inefficiently low con-
tributions to the domestic public good—is due to wrong ex ante decisions, since
the assumption of Nash bargaining at stage 2 ensures that there is no ex post inef-
ficiency. In sum, the personal gains family members make by investing in market
activities are apparently lost at the level of collective contributions to domestic
goods.
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F. Returns to marriage through gender discrimination?
We are now ready to discuss the consequences of labor market discrimination
against women on household behavior. We first investigate how a reduction of
women’s employment opportunities, relative to those of men, affects investments,
time use, and welfare of a family in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the con-
stituent game. We then present comparative statics on the intra-household distri-
bution of utility payoffs.
The feedback effect on aggregate household welfare. Since our aim is
to examine the feedback effect of gender discrimination on men’s and women’s
behavior within the household, we use non-discrimination as a benchmark and
compare it to discriminatory labor market outcomes. Thus suppose that the status
quo in the labor market is full gender equity: θf = θm. That is, the rates of return
on each level of effort and market time are the same to women than to men. We
characterize gender discrimination as a pair of infinitesimal changes in θm and θf
in opposite proportional directions (as discussed in section 3.3). Now consider the
impact of a marginal decrease in θw and a marginal increase in θh on aggregate
household welfare. To derive this we take total differentials of the sum of the (Nash
bargained) equilibrium utilities of all individuals in the household, using (6), and
recalling that wni = w
n
i (θi), and g
e
i = g
e
i (w
n
i , θi). The following general result
is useful in developing our subsequent analysis of the feedback effects of gender
discrimination:
Lemma 1 Consider the case of discrimination for which dθf = −dθ < 0 < dθm =
dθ, with female market opportunities reduced and male market opportunities raised
compared to the non-discrimination benchmark. Then
dWN =
[
wnf
(
1− gef
)
+
1
2
[
θf
(
gnf − g
e
f
)
+
(
gnf
)
′
] ∂wnf
∂θf
]
dθf
+
[
wnm (1− g
e
m) +
1
2
[
θm (g
n
m − g
e
m) + (g
n
m)
′
] ∂wnm
∂θm
]
dθm. (9)
Proof. See the Appendix.
A pair of changes in θf and θm has four opposing effects on aggregate household
welfare. We interpret the expressions in (9) term by term. The first term on the
right-hand side of (9) represents the negative wage-income effect of female income
reduction induced by a marginal decrease in θf . The female wage income effect
is negative precisely because a reduction in θf reduces f ’s marginal return from
putting in effort wnf and time (1 − g
e
f ) at work. On the other hand, the second
term on the right-hand side of (9), which is strictly positive, may be called the
strategic effect of a marginal reduction in θf ; it follows from the fact that a marginal
decrease in θf reduces f ’s incentive to strategically over invest in market activities
(as discussed after Proposition 1). Indeed, the term 12 [θf (g
n
f − g
e
f ) + (g
n
f )
′], which
is negative, represents the exact value of the inefficiency that arises due to f ’s
incentive to strategically over invest in market activities by choosing the privately
optimal wnf rather than the socially optimal w
e
i . Apart from reducing female full
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income and reducing female incentives to behave strategically, discrimination has
two additional effects: the third term on the right-hand side of (9), which is strictly
positive, represents the male wage-income effect, while the fourth term, which is
strictly negative, is the strategic effect of a marginal increase in θm; it follows from
the fact that a marginal increase in θm further increases m’s incentive to behave
strategically inside the household compared to the non-discrimination benchmark.
To investigate the quantitative implications of those four opposing effects, we
make the following additional assumptions: We assume that the cost function b (gi)
and β (wi) are quadratic, which is stated formally in the following:
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Assumption 2
γib(gi) =
γi
2
g2i and β(wi) =
1
2
w2i .
We further assume that γi2 > 1, which ensures that interior solutions for all choice
variables exist. Under these assumptions, we first derive the counterpart of equation
(9). After setting dθf = −dθ = −dθm (where dθ > 0), we obtain the following
result:
Lemma 2 Given Assumption 2, the condition for the change in aggregate house-
hold welfare is:
dWN
dθ
∣∣∣∣
θ˜=θf=θm
=
 θ˜ (γf − 1) (γˆ − γf)(
γf − θ˜
2
)2
 +
 θ˜ (γm − 1) (γm − γˆ)(
γm − θ˜
2
)2
 , (10)
where γˆ = 3.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that γf and γm (where γf < γm by Assumption 1) reflect the inverses of
the family members’ contribution productivities at home, so that i’s contribution
to the domestic public good is an important component of aggregate household
welfare when γi is low and vice versa. The first term in brackets represents the
sum of the negative (wage-income) effect of female full income reduction and the
positive (strategic) effect of reduced female incentives to strategically overinvest in
market activities. Similarly, the second term in brackets captures the sum of the
male wage-income effect (> 0) and the male strategic effect (< 0). The focus of the
subsequent discussion is on equation (10). The following result, which is explored
after its statement, shows that there may be a close connection between women’s
employment opportunities, relative to those of men, and aggregate household wel-
fare.
12We make this assumption purely to simplify the exposition of some of our results, but, it
should emphasized, without affecting our main insights. Let us be more specific: the assumption
of quadratic cost functions guarantees that the third derivatives of b and β are zero. One can
generally show that b′′′ = 0 and β′′′ = 0 are sufficient conditions under which the conclusions
stated in Proposition 2 holds. Weaker sufficient conditions — which, for example, allow for b′′′ > 0
or b′′′ < 0 — exist under which the stated conclusion would also hold.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then gender discrimina-
tion with female market opportunities reduced and male market opportunities raised
compared to the non-discrimination benchmark increases aggregate household wel-
fare.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, the mechanism is the following. Consider first the scenario where
γf < γˆ < γm. In this case female contributions to the household public good
are an important component of aggregate household welfare, while male contribu-
tions are relatively unproductive. The type of gender discrimination considered
here is welfare-enhancing in its impact precisely because it reduces female incen-
tives to strategically overinvest in market activities. This, in turn, shifts female
household public good provisions closer to the first-best than they would be in the
non-discrimination benchmark. What is more, the chain reaction set in motion by
reducing females incentives to overinvest in market activities results in offsetting
the negative effect of female full income reduction. To see this, simply note that
the first-term in brackets in (10) will be strictly positive when γf < γˆ. The ex-
act opposite will be true for men. Male incentives to strategically overinvest in
market activities increase. This, in turn, reduces male household public good pro-
visions even further. However, since male contributions are less productive than
female contributions, male underinvestment in the household sphere is much less of
a problem in terms of aggregate household welfare. In fact, when γˆ < γm, then the
positive male income effect dominates the negative strategic effect. To see, this note
that the second-term in (10) is strictly positive with the parameter values under
consideration.
Consider now the scenario where γf < γm < γˆ, that is, both female and male
contributions in the household sphere are an important component of household
welfare. In this case, the first term in (10) is strictly positive while the second term
is strictly negative. That is, the negative female wage-income effect is offset by the
positive female strategic effect, while the positive male wage-income is dominated
by the negative male strategic effect. It is easily verified that, on aggregate term, the
first term strictly exceeds the second term.13 The intuitive reason for this result
is straightforward. The female (strategic) underprovision of the domestic good
the subgame perfect equilibrium of the constituent is a more severe problem than
the male underprovision because her investment is more productive. Consequently,
given our assumption about domestic technology, a change in θf and θm in opposite
proportional directions will increase female domestic contributions by more than
it reduces male domestic provisions, thereby pushing aggregate household welfare
closer to the first-best outcome.
So, it has been shown that concerns about intra-household lead to over invest-
ment in market activities, which, in turn, implies underprovision of domestic public
goods. In such an environment, discrimination may be long lived precisely because
it plays the role of imposing unequal (marginal) returns on individuals of opposite
13Note that, since we are using non-discrimination as a benchmark and compare it to discrimi-
natory labor market outcomes, the equation (10) must be evaluated at θf = θm = θ˜.
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Figure 1: The relationship between aggregate household welfare and men’s and
women’s relative opportunities outside the household.
sex, thereby reallocating their incentives according to their domestic contribution
efficiencies: discrimination acts as an disincentive to invest in market activities,
pushes women towards greater contributions in the domestic sphere, and thus sus-
tains some of the gains from specialization according to comparative advantages.
The present analysis is limited to environments in which, relative to the non-
discrimination benchmark, discriminatory practices affect the economic opportu-
nities of women and men in opposite proportional directions. Some additional
intuitive insights can be gained by abusing previously used notation and normalize
θf = θ and θm = 1 − θ, where an arbitrary value of θ over the interval θ ∈ [0, θ˜)
(where θ˜ = θf = θm) is a measure of the society’s propensity to discriminate
against women. Figure 1 plots aggregate household welfare W N against the coeffi-
cient θ. Panel (a) depicts household welfare for an arbitrary θ ∈ [0, θ˜). Panel (b)
depicts household welfare when men and women have equal opportunities outside
the household, that is, when θf = θm = θ˜.
What is clear from the figure is that aggregate household welfare is a nonmono-
tonic function of θ.14 Indeed there exist a critical value θˆ over the interval [0, θ˜)
such that an intensification of the “gender gap” (as represented by a decrease in
14We should note that, given Assumption 2, aggregate household welfare is given by
W
N =
θ2f
(
γ2f − 1
)
+ 4γf
(
1− θ2f
)
2γf
(
γf − θ
2
f
) + θ2m (γ2m − 1) + 4γm (1− θ2m)
2γm
(
γm − θ
2
m
)
where θf ≡ θ and θm ≡ 1−θ. Figure 1 depicts the case γf < γm < γˆ. We also note that W
N is not
necessarily nonmonotonic in θ. Indeed, when the parameters are such that either γf < γˆ < γm or
γˆ < γf < γm, then W
N is a strictly decreasing function over the interval [0, θ˜), with a maximum
at the corner θ = 0. In the case where γf < γˆ < γm, W
N decreases at decreasing rates; when
γˆ < γf < γm, then W
N decreases at increasing rates.
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θ) increases welfare for all θ ∈ (θˆ, θ˜). While we do not propose to characterize the
critical value θˆ, some remarks on its structure worth making. In particular, it is
readily verified that the larger are the comparative advantages of women over men
in terms of contributions in the domestic sphere, the smaller is the value of θˆ (and
hence the larger the “gender gap”) at which household welfare is maximized.
The discussion thus far has focused on the relative positions men and women
occupy within the labor market, and the consequences for aggregate household wel-
fare. We have said little about the potential effect on intra-household distributions.
We now turn to a closer examination of this issue.
The feedback effect on intra-household distributions. Proposition 2 im-
plies that a welfare maximizing ‘society’ or ‘central planner’ may never wish to end
discrimination as a way of supporting family arrangements with a sustained special-
ization according to comparative advantages. So far, we have left it entirely open
as to how gender discrimination in the labor market affects the final distribution
of utilities within the household. An obvious measure of the final distribution of
utilities (i.e., of intra-household inequality) in this representative household is the
deviation from ‘equal shares’ of the female partner’s Nash bargained utility payoff:
I =
uNf
WN
−
1
2
=
1
2
[
dNf − d
N
m
WN
]
. (11)
Changes in the final distribution of utilities will depend, therefore, on how changes
in θw and θh affect total household welfare as captured by the household welfare
function WN . In fact when household welfare increases then the final distribution
of utilities between uNf and u
N
m will, other things being equal, become more equal.
Similarly, when household welfare decreases then the final distribution of utilities
between uNf and u
N
m will, other things being equal, become more unequal. Of course,
other things are not equal and the disagreement payoffs dNf and d
N
m (i.e., the relative
bargaining positions within the household) will also change with changes in θf and
θm. It this interaction which is of interest and which yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Labor discrimination against women does tend to go with greater
anti-female bias in intra-family distributions:
2(duNf ) =
[
wnf
(
2− gef − g
n
f
)
−
∂gnf
∂θf
]
dθf−
[
wnm (g
e
m − g
n
m)− 2 (g
n
m)
′
∂wnm
∂θm
−
∂gnm
∂θm
]
dθm < 0
and
2(duNm) =
[
wnm (2− g
e
m − g
n
m)−
∂gnm
∂θm
]
dθm−
[
wnf
(
gef − g
n
f
)
− 2
(
gnf
)
′
∂wnf
∂θf
−
∂gnf
∂θf
]
dθf > 0,
implying that the male partner is always better off and the female partner is always
worse off compared to the non-discrimination benchmark.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Discrimination has two opposing effects on the female partner’s Nash bargained
equilibrium payoff. On the one the hand, total household welfare increases (see
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Propositions 2 and 3), the Pareto frontier shifts outwards, and the female partner
reaps half of that increase. On the other hand, gender discrimination in the labor
market affects marital bargaining power directly. The wife’s disagreement payoff
dNf decreases and the husbands disagreement payoff d
N
m increases. Therefore, the
inequality between dNm and d
N
f increases, which, in turn, increases the inequality
between uNf and u
N
m. The above result then implies that, on aggregate terms, the
female partner’s bargaining position deteriorates by more than half the increase
in household welfare. Hence, the persistence of discrimination can have serious
repercussions for women by not only decreasing their opportunities and rewards in
the labor market but by also increasing intra-household inequality.
So, to summarize, when intra-household bargaining positions are determined
endogenously according to spousal incomes , then the power relationship in the
family closely resembles the relative opportunities of men and women in the exist-
ing stratification system of the labor market. Consequently discrimination against
women in the labor market goes hand-in-hand with an unbalanced distribution of
family power. We can thus expect that when women are excluded from attaining
equal access to valued positions in the labor market, then inequality in equilibrium
payoffs at the household level will also persist. It should be also emphasized that the
very presence of gender discrimination in the labor market may result in a ‘Kuznets
effect’ at the micro level of intra-household allocations: households become better
off because females are less likely to strategically overinvest in market activities;
but better off households become more unequal.15
The results of the static model are interesting per se. If investments in individual
earning powers are presumed to affect intra-household bargaining powers, our study
demonstrates that excessive incentives to invest in market activities will curtail the
couple’s present contributions to domestic public goods. In such an environment,
discrimination is likely to be long-lived because it guarantees second-best household
arrangements and thus sustains the some of benefits that ‘society’ gains from the
specialization of men and women according to comparative advantages.
Yet, the baseline model lacks an important dimension of the reality of household
behavior: we have described a ‘static’ model, in that the spouses are determining
their relationship after one period. Implicitly, therefore, we have been ignoring
the potential effects of reputation. This restrictive since it is often argued that
reputational forces can overcome many of the inefficiencies identified in the first
half of this paper. In the following section we explore the robustness of our results
to such ‘dynamic’ considerations. In particular, we address the questions of when
and how a household may succeed in using its resources efficiently in a self-enforcing
manner.
4 Fully Cooperative Household Outcomes
In this part, we study the ability of family members to achieve efficient outcomes
when the underlying family structures are sub-optimal. The key to our approach
15Kuznets (1955) posed the classic question as to whether inequality increases or decreases as
the economy grows.
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is recognizing that when households are potentially trapped by strategic over in-
vestments in market activities, then implicit informal agreements enforced through
repeated interaction can protect family members against the resulting inefficient
outcome. As we mentioned below, while the likely importance of ‘reputational
forces’ within households has been mentioned by numerous authors, the theoret-
ical argument has not previously been developed. The repeated-game version of
the base model of Section 2 is well-suited to analyze implicit agreements between
spouses enforced through reputational forces.
A. Efficient Household Equilibrium
Suppose the parties play repeatedly the constituent game described in the previous
section. We assume complete information, that is, at each decision node both
players can observe the entire back history of the game. Call Γ (δ) the resulting
repeated game with joint discount factor δ. Unlike in the constituent game, the
repeated interactions among spouses may provide incentives to achieve and sustain
an efficient household equilibrium (EHE, for short), provided the spouses value
their reputations sufficiently. The chore of our analysis is therefore deriving the
incentive-compatibility conditions that are required to hold in order for there to
exist an EHE in which, in each period, the Pareto-efficient outcome is reached and
no strategic problems arise. We analyze grim-trigger-strategy equilibria, in which
the EHE is sustained by moving play to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the
constituent game if any spouse ever unilaterally deviates from the EHE path
There are, of course, several plausible manners in which the opportunity to
sustain efficient outcomes can be interlaced within the structure of the constituent
game. We know turn to a description of one such ‘implicit agreement’ between
spouses. Suppose that at the beginning of their relationship the spouses meet
and agree not to behave strategically throughout their relationship. That is, they
commit themselves to choose (in each period t = 1, 2, ...,∞) the socially optimal
wi = w
e
i and gi = g
e
i (i = f, m) in order to maximize aggregate household welfare.
To support the efficient outcome on the equilibrium path of the repeated game,
the spouses may need to split the surplus from cooperation in a different way than
in the constituent game. We assume that to split the gains from cooperation, the
spouses also implicitly commit themselves to a per-period utility transfer t̂ ∈ <
from m to f (which can be positive or negative). The transfer will be determined
later. If both spouses “honor” this implicit agreement and cooperate, then the per-
period payoffs of the spouses along the EHE path are given by uEf + t̂ and u
E
m − t̂,
where
uEi = θiw
e
i [1− g
e
i (w
e
i )] +
[
gef
(
wef
)
+ gem (w
e
m)
]
− γib (g
e
i (w
e
i ))− βi (w
e
i ) .
However, since an agreement on (wef , w
e
m, g
e
f , g
e
m) and t̂ is not automatically enforce-
able,16 each spouse can choose whether or not to renege on his or her part of the
16This is precisely because the vector
(
wef , w
e
m, g
e
f , g
e
m
)
and the transfer t̂ do not constitute a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game.
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agreement at any of the two stages within each period: either at stage 1: either at
stage 1 by choosing wi 6= w
e
i , or, at stage 2 by choosing not to make (or accept)
the agreed transfer t̂. If any family member unilaterally violates the agreement,
then immediately play proceeds according to the constituent game in Section 3. In
particular, if family member i deviates at stage 1 by choosing wi 6= w
e
i , then the
division of the marital surplus in that period would be determined by the parties
respective disagreement points di and dj (as in the constituent game). That is,
bargaining at stage 2 would result in the ‘split-the-difference’ rule. It thus follows
immediately that i’s deviation payoff is maximized by deviating at stage 1 and
setting wi = w
n
i . Hence the deviation investment level at stage 1 is equal to the
investment level in the constituent game. Family member i’s deviation payoff of
setting wi = w
n
i at stage 1 therefore equals
uDi =
WD + dNi − d
B
j
2
. (12)
For explicitness we have introduced some shortcut variables. The expression W D
represents joint family welfare when i behaves as unilateral defector, while j honors
the implicit agreement.17 The expression dNi represents the disagreement point of
the spouse who behaves as a unilateral defector. (Note that the deviation disagree-
ment point of i is equal to his or her disagreement point in the constituent game.18)
Finally, dBi represents the disagreement point of the “betrayed” spouse, that is, the
one who honors the implicit agreement and chooses socially optimal actions at stage
1.19
Since the EHE is not a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game,
the EHE path can only be sustained by the threat of credible punishment if any
spouse ever unilaterally deviates from the EHE path. We assume that the parties
support the EHE through grim-trigger strategies. That is, if any family unilaterally
violates the EHE, then immediately his or her partner punishes this transgression by
switching play forever after to subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game.
Such punishment is credible in that each family member willingly participates in
punishment, given the other’s participation. Family member i’s payoff along the
“punishment path” therefore equals his or her payoff in the constituent game:
uNi =
WN + dNi − d
N
j
2
. (13)
Again we are using shortcut variables: W N denotes joint family welfare in the
constituent game, while dNi − d
N
j represents the relative bargaining positions along
the punishment path.
B. The Incentive-Compatibility Conditions
An efficient household equilibrium is self-enforcing if, in each period, family mem-
ber i (i = f, m) sets wi = w
e
i at stage 1, sets gi = g
e
i (w
e
i ) at stage 2, and the agreed
17Therefore W D as in (4), but with gei replaced by g
e
i (w
n
i ) and g
e
j replaced by g
e
j = g
e
j (w
e
j ).
18Hence dNi is as in (2), but with g
n
i replaced by g
n
i (w
n
i ).
19Hence dBi is as in (2), but with g
n
i replaced by g
n
i (w
e
i ).
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transfer t̂ is implemented. Of course, the efficient outcome will be supported in
equilibrium if and only if the discounted payoff stream from honoring the implicit
agreement that sustains the EHE exceeds the discounted payoff stream from the
deviation-punishment path. It is straightforward to verify that the partners’ re-
spective incentive constraints are given by
δ
[(
uEf + t̂
)
− uNf
]
≥ (1− δ)
[
uDf −
(
uEf + t̂
)]
δ
[(
uEm − t̂
)
− uNm
]
≥ (1− δ)
[
uDm −
(
uEm − t̂
)]
,
The left-hand side of each inequality represents the long-term average cost of devi-
ating from the EHE path. This is because from next period onwards, f ’s per-period
loss would be
(
uFf + t
)
− uNf , while m’s per-period loss would be
(
uFm − t
)
− uNm.
The right-hand side of each inequality represents the short-term average benefit
from the optimal deviation. Through straightforward manipulation of these two
inequalities, we obtain that agreed utility-transfer t̂ is incentive-compatible if and
only if
t̂ ≥ (1− δ)
[
uDf − u
N
f
]
−
(
uEf − u
N
f
)
(14)
t̂ ≤
(
uEm − u
N
m
)
− (1− δ)
[
uDm − u
N
f
]
. (15)
These conditions are the parties’ incentive-compatibility conditions, which are re-
quired to be satisfied in order for the EHE to be sustainable as a subgame-perfect
equilibrium path. So far, we have been silent on the properties of the equilibrium
transfer t̂ along the EHE path. We now turn our attention to this issue.
C. An Example of Possible Co-operation: “Equal Sharing”
How do husbands and wives plan to share in the spoils from cooperation? There
are many possible scenarios, and our aim is not simply the demonstration that
household equilibria that generate efficient outcomes in the repeated game exist, but
rather the exploration of descriptively interesting sharing rules that support efficient
resource allocations in the long-term. We now construct an example of a bargaining
game in which the family members agree to implement, at the beginning of their
relationship, a sharing rule that splits the gains from cooperation equally between
them. That is, we assume that the bargaining over the sharing rule at the outset
of marriage is such that the equilibrium negotiated transfer can be characterized
by the Nash bargaining solution with the disagreement point (0, 0). A natural
interpretation of the repeated game model is thus implicit in its description: the
model captures an environment in which the probability that one person exerts
his or her (bargaining) power over the other partner at the outset of marriage
is negligible.20 Although we lack the direct evidence to make such an assertion,
we strongly suspect that this captures a very realistic feature of life. Namely the
stylized fact that the balance of power when a couple is first married is more or
20Farrell and Scotchmer (1988, p. 279), in their introductory discussion of partnerships, note
that “marriage is an equal sharing, and we avoid making spouses’ payoffs depend on their outside
opportunities.”
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less equal, and then shifts in line with the individual’s access to resources such
as income or occupational status (see, for example, Hesse-Biber and Williamson,
1984).21
The following alternative interpretation is also applicable: the model represents
an environment in which the family members have a good sense, somehow socially
and culturally derived, that equal sharing is a norm that supports mutually bene-
ficial household outcomes; but also the fact that once this norm is violated family
members will permanently enter into (costly) bargains in search of a new ‘sharing
rule’ along the punishment path.
Given our assumption that the sharing rule t̂ can be characterized by the Nash
bargaining solution with disagreement point (0, 0), an application of NBS implies
that the equilibrium negotiated sharing rules maximizes (uEf + t̂)(u
E
m − t̂) subject
to (14) and (15). The following intermediate result is useful in developing our
subsequent analysis of an efficient household equilibrium with equal sharing:
Lemma 3 For each i = f, m, define
φi ≡
[
(1− δi) u
D
i + δiu
N
i
]
. (16)
(a) If the parameter values are such that 12(u
E
f + u
E
m) > max{φf , φm}, then the
equilibrium negotiated sharing rule is given by
tS =
uEm − u
E
f
2
. (17)
(b) Otherwise, if the parameter values are such that 12(u
E
f + u
E
m) ≤ max{φf , φm},
then the equilibrium negotiated sharing rule is a corner solution given by
tCo =
{
uEf − φf if
1
2(u
E
f + u
E
m) ≤ φf
uEm − φm if
1
2(u
E
f + u
E
m) ≤ φm
. (18)
Proof. Straightforward – hence omitted.
It is now straightforward (after substituting tS for t̂ in (14) and (15), and sim-
plifying) to derive the appropriate incentive-compatibility constraints under which
the EHE with “equal sharing” can be sustained as a sub-game perfect equilibrium
path:
21It should be emphasized that no general consensus on how to determine the “sharing rule”
in repeated hold-up problems has been reached in the literature. The “incomplete contracting
approach” (Halonen 2002) generally postulates a sharing that provides partners with balanced
incentives to deviate from Pareto-efficient outcomes. It is however silent on whether the partners
would agree in equilibrium to such a sharing rule. The “basic property rights approach” (Muthoo,
2004) assumes that the equilibrium negotiated sharing rule can be characterized by the Nash
bargaining solution, in which the disagreement point is given by the payoffs of the underlying
(inefficient) constituent game. So other sharing rules than “equal sharing” are of course possible.
But in general it seems descriptively most persuasive that marital partners plan to share the spoils
from cooperation fifty-fifty, but may have an incentive to renege on this sharing rule once the
marital relationship is under way.
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Proposition 4 The EHE can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium path
(using “equal sharing”) if and only if δ ≥ δ∗f (θ) and δ ≥ δ
∗
m (θ), where
δ∗f (θ) = 1−
1
2(u
E
f + u
E
m)− u
N
f
uDf − u
N
f
and δ∗m (θ) = 1−
1
2(u
E
f + u
E
m)− u
N
m
uDm − u
N
m
(19)
with θ = (θf , θm).
In the one-shot game studied in the previous section, labor discrimination against
women was likely to be long-lived because it guaranteed traditional household ar-
rangements and thus sustained some of the benefits from the division of labor in
different spheres. The issues that arise in the repeated-game framework are very
different. In particular, the values of the threshold discount factors δ∗f and δ
∗
m de-
pend in a not-so-simple manner on the value of the discrimination coefficient θ. We
now follow the tradition in the theory of repeated games by adopting the minimum
discount factors δ∗f and δ
∗
m at which the EHE can be achieved in subgame-perfect
equilibrium as a measure of long-term marital efficiency. The main focus of the
analysis below is to examine how changes in θf and θm affects δ
∗
f and δ
∗
m. Interest
in this question is explained by the fact that is important to know how environmen-
tal forces affect the degree of cooperation that can be sustained within marriage.
D. The Rationale for Gender Discrimination to Disappear
How do social, legal or cultural attitudes towards gender discrimination affect the
propensity that efficient household equilibria with “equal sharing” rules emerge?
How do those attitudes affect the likelihood that such equilibria can be sustained
in the long-run? Our first result concerns the question of how labor discrimination
against women affect the prospects for full cooperation within households:
Proposition 5 Suppose the parameter values are such that uEf +u
E
m > max{φf , φm}.
Gender discrimination with female market opportunities reduced and male market
opportunities raised compared to non-discrimination benchmark would make the
husband less likely to cooperate (dδ∗m > 0) and the wife more likely to cooperate(
dδ∗f < 0
)
within the marital relationship.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The factors considered in this paper —
namely that the amount of income a person earns dictates the relative bargaining
position inside the household — imply that men have a bargaining power advan-
tage under discrimination compared to the non-discrimination benchmark. This, in
turn, makes men more likely to deviate from the EHE path. Intuitively, there are
two reasons for this. First, the male partner would receive a large short-term gain
from a unilateral deviation from “equal sharing”. In the same time, the punishment
imposed on male deviators would be minimal. To see this, note that when play re-
verts to the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the constituent game after a unilateral
22
Table 1: Threshold Discount Factors
Index of Women’s Relative Threshold
Market Opportunities Discount Factors
θ δ∗f δ
∗
m
θ˜ = .5 .473 .526
.49 .425 .580
.48 .381 .639
.47 .341 .705
.46 .304 .776
.45 .271 .855
.44 .239 .941
.43 .212 n.s.
defection from the EHE path, it is the case that (i) discrimination improves aggre-
gate marital surplus compared to the non-discrimination benchmark (as discussed
after Proposition 2); and (ii) men have relatively greater power within the family
compared to the non-discrimination benchmark and are therefore able to command
a larger share of joint marital surplus along the punishment path (as discussed
after Proposition 3). So, the fact that economic inequality in the labor market
contributes to an imbalance of power within marriage implies that discriminated
against females have difficulties enforcing cooperative family outcomes precisely
because they are extremely limited to credibly punish opportunistic behavior by
their male partners. This may severely restrict the willingness of male partners to
participate in cooperative family agreements in the first place.
To illustrate the above result more concretely, we report the results of a numer-
ical example (using Assumption 2). Let γf = 2.05 and γm = 2.07. Also, let use the
normalization θf = θ and θm = 1 − θ. For values of θ ∈ [0, 0.5] (recall that with
θf = θ and θm = 1 − θ, θ˜ = 0.5 represents the non-discrimination benchmark),
we calculate the thresholds δ∗f and δ
∗
m, the lowest discount factors for which one
can sustain cooperation. Lower values of δ∗f and δ
∗
m imply that it is easier to sus-
tain cooperation. The results of the numerical example in question are reported
in Table 1. Notice that when men and women have equal opportunities outside
the household, then their incentives to cooperate at the household level are at a
medium level rather than one’s being very high but the other’s being very low. Next
note that δ∗f decreases monotonically with reductions in θ. On the other hand, δ
∗
m
rises monotonically with reductions in θ. This implies that, regardless where one
starts, reduced relative market opportunities for women makes male cooperation at
the household level more difficult to sustain. Suppose, for example, that δ = 0.55.
When men and women have exactly the same market opportunities, it is possible
to sustain efficient outcomes at the household level. However, a small reduction in
employment opportunities for women would automatically create conditions for the
efficient outcome to be no longer sustainable (in the sense that the male threshold
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discount factor δ∗m would be above the discount factor δ). On the other hand,
suppose that δ = 0.8. In this case, an environment with large disparities in the
labor market (say with θ = 0.45) is inimical to emergence of efficient outcomes
at the household level. However, a small expansion in employment opportunities
for women would translate into fully cooperative (and hence efficient) household
outcomes.
Are there pointers for policy? Our analysis suggests that the reality of la-
bor market discrimination against women assigns men and women assigns men
and women to different roles within marital relationships. The resulting division
of labor generates unequal bargaining positions within families because men can
accumulate resources (primarily earning power) which translates into a bargaining
power advantage. This male advantage makes it difficult for females to enforce fully
cooperative (and hence efficient) outcomes at the household level. The immediate,
main policy consequences are thus self-evident:
• If the labor market environment exhibits gender discrimination for women,
and discount factors are such that the efficient household equilibrium (EHE)
does initially not exist, then empowering women (through institutional or
legal reform) may create the conditions for the EHE to emerge and be sus-
tainable in the long-run.
• If, on the other hand, discount factors are such that an efficient household
equilibrium does initially exist, then a small increase of gender differentials
in the labor market may create conditions for the EHE to be no longer sus-
tainable.
Note that there are some additional insights that are implied by our numerical
example concerning the existence of parameter values under which there does not
exist a subgame perfect equilibrium that sustains an efficient household equilibrium
in which the spouses split the spoils from full cooperation equally. In particular,
there exists a critical value θ¯ ∈ [0, θ˜) (which lies between 0.43 and 0.44 in the
context of the parameters used for the example) such that if θ ∈ [0, θ¯), then an
efficient household equilibrium with “equal sharing” can never emerge in the long-
run (i.e., not even in the limit as δ tends to one). The intuition is simple and follows
from the fact when women’s relative market opportunities are below the threshold
θ¯, then the sharing rule tS that splits the gains from cooperation equally between
the spouses is not incentive compatible. More precisely, tS fails to satisfy the male
partner’s incentive constraint (15) in the sense that agreement to it would give him
a utility level along the EHE path that is below what he could get from reneging
on the agreement that sustains the EHE. This has to be viewed within the logic
that the male partner would loose out when the EHE is established since he would
then not be able to use his (large) bargaining power advantage to extract a large
share of the marital surplus. In this case, the sharing rule is a corner solution and
given by tCo = uEm − φm (see Lemma 2b). The equilibrium payoffs are
u¯m = φm and u¯f = u
E
f + u
E
m − φm,
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Figure 2: Relationship between gains from marriage and men’s and women’s relative
opportunities outside the household in the repeated game.
where u¯m > u¯f . As such, our main qualitative insights about intra-household
inequality — in particular, that labor discrimination against women triggers dif-
ferences in equilibrium payoffs at the household level — is robust when the family
members interact in a sequence of situations and can sustain the Pareto efficient
outcome.
We conclude this section by returning to one of the questions raised at the
outset of this paper. Can we theoretically account for the possibility that the gains
from marriage increase even as specialization within marriage decreases? Figure
2 illustrates and summarizes our main insights, using the normalization θf = θ
and θm = 1 − θ. For a given discount factor δ, it plots aggregate family welfare
against the discrimination coefficient θ. Recall that θ = θ˜ describes an environment
with equal opportunities for men and women outside the household, while θ < θ˜
captures an environment that disadvantages women and favors men. Also note that
the coefficient θ not only measure the opportunities of women in the labor market,
but it is also an index of the degree of specialization within households. This is
exactly because a small value of θ provides little incentives for women to invest in
market activities and large incentives to put available endowments to productive
use in the household sphere. The figure clearly shows that aggregate family welfare
is a discontinuous function of θ.22
For values of θ over the interval [0, θ˜), female face low opportunities outside the
household compared to men, and there exists a substantial degree of division of
22We have used the following numerical example to construct Figure 2. We let bi(gi) =
γig
2
i
2
,
β(wi) =
w2
i
2
(i = f, m) , and (γm, γf ) = (2.4, 2.1) , so that there is difference in the spouses home
productivities, with the female partner having a comparative advantage. In addition, we consider
discount factors δ ' 0.84. With this we have θˆ ≈ 0.5.
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labor in the household. The household as a whole recaptures some of the advan-
tages of the specialization of family members according to comparative advantages,
but cooperation (and hence efficient household outcomes) do not emerge in a self-
enforcing way. This is exactly because wives have little power in family bargains,
and are consequently restricted to enforce efficient household equilibria because
they are extremely limited to punish opportunistic behavior of their male partners.
What is more, there is a anti-female bias in intra-family distribution (as discussed
after Proposition 3).
When θ equals θ˜, women have the same opportunities outside the household
as men. We note that there may still exist some degree of division of labor in the
household,23 but less extreme than before and less dependent on traditional sex
roles. Put it differently, both spouses participate more equally in the market and in
household production. The implications for aggregate household welfare are very
powerful, the most notable feature being the sizeable increase in the gains from
marriage at θ˜. The increase in the gains from marriage arises in equilibrium pre-
cisely because the better opportunities of women outside the household maintains a
balance in the incentives to cooperate within the household. Put it differently, the
greater participation of women in the market gives them power in family bargains
based on income contributions. This, in turn, gives them a means to punish op-
portunistic behavior within households, and so limits the extent to which husbands
have an incentive to renege on efficient household equilibria with equal sharing. In
sum, even if grant that specialization according to comparative advantages produce
some joint gain in marriage, the above results suggest there is a countervailing force
which actually generates a larger joint gain when spouses play similar rather than
different “roles” both inside and outside marriage.
5 Discussion: The Relationship between Working and
Family Life
The model described above has a number of specific implications, some of which
we have already discussed. In this section, we highlight the major points more
generally and present empirical predictions that are relevant to some.
• Limits to specialization: the effects of reputation. Our findings are particu-
larly interesting in the context of prior work, which has typically concluded that
the specialization of family member according to comparative advantages would
raise the gains from marriage. When family members have ‘common preferences’,
Becker (1991) has argued that family members will specialize according to compar-
ative advantages, not only regarding the division of labor, but also when it comes
to human capital investments. Moreover, with common preferences, investments as
well as time will be allocated efficiently, i.e., so as to maximize joint family welfare.
Becker’s (arguably powerful) approach ignores, however, the existence of so called
cooperative conflicts inside the family. The class of problems called ‘cooperative
conflicts’ generally acknowledges that in many social arrangements there are co-
23This is because females have a comparative advantage in home production (see Assumption
2).
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operative elements, but also elements of conflict in the choice of one arrangement
rather than another.24 The existence of such cooperative conflicts within house-
holds is now fully acknowledged by discussions of the bargaining problem inside
the family. Vagstad (2001) shows that even if real conflicts inside the family are
accounted for, different family members will continue to specialize according to
comparative advantages. However, the result that family decision-making is effi-
cient does no longer hold: investments will be inefficient because they are chosen
opportunistically so as to affect the outcome of the bargaining process itself.
Our family behavior model acknowledges the possibility of real conflicts of in-
terests coexisting with an understanding of what is a natural way to overcome the
inefficiencies due to ‘cooperative conflicts’. The key to our approach is recognizing
that reputational forces can alleviate many of the problems of opportunism iden-
tified in static bargaining models of the family. One of the fundamental insights
that we obtain is that if the family members are identical in every respect—that
is, they have identical market and non-market skills and face equal opportunities—
then reputational forces are most likely to work. Indeed, in such circumstances, the
efficient outcome (like in Becker’s framework) can be sustained for the widest set
of possible parameter values. However, if the family members are different in some
respects (such as in their occupational status), then there exists a conflict in the
partners’ incentives to sustain the agreement that guarantees the efficient outcome.
For, in such circumstances, the shifting balance of power within the family makes
the dominant partner (i.e., the one with power based on income contributions) more
likely to renege on his or her part of the agreement. Hence, where two members
of a household specialize completely in the market and household sector respec-
tively, our study predicts that reputation is least likely to overcome the problems
of opportunism. And, without the influence of reputation, cooperation is unlikely
to be sustainable inside the family. This conclusion finds clear confirmation in the
United Nations adoption of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995)
in which the ratifying countries declare that
“[E]qual rights, opportunities and access to resources, equal sharing of
responsibilities for the family by men and women, and a harmonious
partnership between them are critical to their well-being and that of
their families as well as to the consolidation of democracy.”25
In contrast, ‘Beckerian’ theories of specialization emphasize the benefits that ‘soci-
ety’ would gain from the division of labor in exclusively different spheres—and thus
fail to provide a rationale for initiatives promoting equal responsibilities of women
and men in all sectors, including the family, the labor market and society at large.
• The balance of power inside the family closely resembles the position of men
and women in the existing stratification system of the labor market. Marriage and
family life is very much a matter of give and take. But who gives and who takes?
Such issues are resolved by a process of negotiating and bargaining. Hence the con-
cept of bargaining power is a key to understanding the interactions between different
24See Sen (1990) for an insightful characterization and analysis of co-operative conflicts.
25See, for example, the OECD Development Assistant Committee (1998), Annex 2, Article 15,
p. 35.
27
members of the family. With the intra-household balance of power determined en-
dogenously according to spousal incomes, the existence of gender discrimination
in the labor market goes hand-in-hand with an unbalanced distribution of family
power. Thus, without equal access to pay and occupational status, women lack an
important tool in determining the allocation of household resources. From a distri-
butional point of view one should be concerned, therefore, that the gender gap in
the labor market increases the differences in equilibrium payoffs at the household
level (as discussed after Proposition 3).
Why does this matter? Firstly, gender equality in all sectors is an important
goal in itself—an issue of human rights and social justice (see, for example, United
Nations Development Program, 1995). Secondly, the well-being of children — in
particular in the context of poor countries — is intrinsically bound up with that
of women: a certain amount of money given to the male partner and the same
amount given to the female can have very different effects on a child’s education,
health, and the incidence of child labor (Basu, 2001). Thirdly, in many parts of
the world, a neglect of the notion of ‘intra-household inequality’ is likely to lead to
considerable understatement of the levels of inequality and poverty. In this regard,
Haddad and Kanbur (1990) found underestimation by 30 percent and more in an
analysis of inequality in calorie intake on the basis of Philippine data set. Finally,
sociologists have long emphasized that the failure to address gender inequalities
within households is significant because the family is the most influential institution
of social development. In this regard, households that operate according to power
arrangements based on gender differences are unlikely to be environments in which
to ‘unlearn’ norms of inequality (see, for example, Moller Okin, 1995).
While the above discussion is tailored to the context of developing countries,
the problem of gender discrimination in the labor market can also have an effect
on families in the economically advanced countries of Europe and North America.
• Gender-specific labor market trends and divorce rates: some speculations on
the empirical relationship. Marriage and family life provide a means of attaining
specific economic goals, and these relationships persist as long as both partners
expect to be better off married than divorced (Becker et al., 1977).26 We can relax
our assumption that divorce is impossible and modify our model to allow for the
probability of divorce to be positive and endogenously determined by the level of
“surplus” generated by that marriage (see, for example, Weiss and Willis,1985).
Imagine first that divorce is the relevant threat point in the family bargain.27 In
addition, let the spouses payoffs in marriage be ui + εi (rather than ui as in (1)),
where the private gains from marriage, εi, are randomly drawn from a known
26Becker et al. (1977) demonstrate that the assertion that a couple will divorce each other only
if it is efficient to do so is a special case of the Coase theorem (Coase, 1960).
27Konrad and Lommerud (2000) note that the predictions of using noncooperation as the dis-
agreement point in the family bargain are similar to the case with utilities as single as the divorce
threat point. The difference between noncooperation and divorce is that the parties in the former
case still live together so the family public goods are still public goods. After a divorce some goods
cease to be public goods, whereas others, as children, remain public goods. For the discussion
to follow, let us interpret the disagreement points df and dm as the divorce threat points of the
parties.
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distribution and measure the quality of the marriage.28 It is straightforward to
show that the partners remain married if the total gains from marriage exceed
the total gains from divorce; i.e., when φ = (εf + εm) ≥ −(W − df − df ) where
W = uf + um captures the surplus generated by that marriage.
In such an environment, a marriage can remain intact either because the private
gains from marriage, εi, are high, or because the surplus generated by that marriage,
W , is high. The surplus generated is, of course, maximized when family-decision
making is efficient, i.e., when the first-best is implicitly enforced through repeated
interaction. However, as we have shown in the preceding section, when family-
decision making is efficient, then a small increase in the discrimination coefficient
may create conditions for the first-best to be no longer sustainable. For, in such
circumstances, the shifting balance of power within the family makes the male
partner less likely to cooperate and more likely to renege the implicit agreement
that sustains the first-best. Thus, an increase in the discrimination coefficient may
shift family decision making from efficient to inefficient, inducing a fall in the surplus
generated. Since a decrease in the surplus generated also decreases the gain from
staying married compared to the gain from divorce, couples with an unbalanced
distribution of bargaining power are more likely to divorce.
Hence, there are good reasons to believe that women’s equal access to income
and occupational status in the labor market is likely to reduce the probability of
divorce, by essentially increasing the degree of cooperation that can be sustained
within the family. This conclusion goes counter to popular opinion that the in-
creased labor force participation of married women in Western countries is respon-
sible for much of the acceleration in divorce rates over the past four decades. In
general, the framework discussed here provides a basis for understanding how two
significant trends over the last few decade—the rise in divorce rates, and the gender
gap in pay and occupational status—are correlated.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has explored the theoretical basis for the claim that the full impact of
gender discrimination also includes feedback effects on women’s and men’s strategic
behavior within the household. To understand this interaction theoretically it is
necessary to study it as a part of a model that links household and labor market
decisions. Our findings are directly relevant to the literature on the economics of
the family, in that they call into question the views mentioned at the outset of
the paper. One should not necessarily expect that the efficiencies of specialization
produce a large joint gain in marriage, nor should gender discrimination be a con-
structive social force that ensures that gains from specialization at the household
level are not wasted. Instead, our results suggest that the reality of labor market
28The sequence of events that we have in mind is as follows. In each period, at stage 1, each
partner makes the investment into his or her individual earning power. At stage 1 1
2
, each partner’s
private gain from marriage is realized, and the investment decisions are observed. At stage 2, if they
remain married, the partners bargain over time allocations and the surplus created by marriage
over divorce. If they, divorce each spouse chooses his or her time allocation non-cooperatively.
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discrimination against women assigns men and women to different roles within mar-
ital relationships.The resulting division of labor generates unequal intra-household
bargaining positions because men accumulate resources (primarily earning power)
which translate into a bargaining power advantage. This male advantage makes
it very difficult to implement fully cooperative (and hence efficient) outcomes at
the household level, because women are severely restricted to credibly punish op-
portunistic behavior by their male partners. Conversely, efforts to promote greater
gender equality in labor markets lead to more balanced bargaining positions within
families and thus increase the likelihood that the household remains an institution
that is successful in allocating its resources efficiently.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Differentiating uNi in (6) w.r.t wi yields
∂uNi
∂wi
= θi(2−g
e
i−g
n
i )−
=0 by (5)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θiwi − 2g + γib
′
i (g
e
i )
]
(geh)
′−
=1 by (3)︷ ︸︸ ︷[
θiwi + γib
′
i (g
n
i )
]
(gni )
′ = 2β′(wi)
where gei = g
e
i (wi) and g
n
i = g
n
i (wi) with
(gei )
′ =
∂gei
∂wi
= −
θi
γib
′′(gei )
< 0 and (gni )
′ =
∂gni
∂wi
= −
θi
γib
′′(gni )
< 0.
After using the first-order conditions in (3) and (5), we obtain condition (8) [which
is stated in the proposition]. We then note that the private marginal return of
choosing wi is given by the left-hand side of (8):
rp ≡
1
2
[
θi [2− g
e
i (wi)− g
n
i (wi)]− (g
n
i )
′
]
.
Similarly, the social marginal return of choosing wi is given by the left-hand side
of (7):
rs ≡ θi [1− g
e
i (wi)] .
Differencing rp and rs one obtains
rp − rs =
1
2
[
θi(g
e
i − g
n
i )− (g
n
i )
′
]
> 0.
This term is strictly positive because gei > g
n
i and (g
n
i )
′ < 0. Since the private
marginal return strictly exceeds the social marginal return, it follows that, at any
equilibrium at stage 1, the equilibrium market investments (wnf , w
n
m) are strictly
above the joint surplus maximizing levels (wef , w
e
m). Furthermore, since g
e
i is a
strictly decreasing function of wi, it follows that g
e
i (w
n
i ) < g
e
i (w
e
i ).
Proof of Lemma 1:
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Let the household welfare function be defined on the sum of (Nash bargained)
utilities of the two family members. At the equilibrium of the constituent game we
have that
WN =
∑
i=f,m
θiw
n
i (1− g
e
i ) + 2g
e
i − γibi (g
e
i )− β (w
n
i ) , (20)
where gei = g
e
i (w
n
i , θi) and w
n
i = w
n
i (θi). Consider the case of discrimination for
which dθf = −dθ < 0 < dθ = dθm, with female market opportunities reduced and
male market opportunities raised compared to the non-discrimination benchmark.
After totally differentiating W N , the expression for the change in household welfare
is
dWN =
[
wnf
(
1− gef
)
+
[
θf
(
1− gef
)
− β′
(
wnf
)] ∂wnf
∂θf
]
dθf
+
[
wnm (1− g
e
m) +
[
θm (1− g
e
m)− β
′ (wnm)
] ∂wnm
∂θm
]
dθm. (21)
After making use of (8) to substitute out β ′ (wni ) , expression (9) [which is stated
in the lemma] follows immediately.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Given Assumption 2, it is readily checked that the cooperative and non-cooperative
public good contributions at stage 2 are respectively given by
gei = f
(
2− θiwi
γi
)
=
2− θiwi
γi
and gni = f
(
1− θiwi
γi
)
=
1− θiwi
γi
,
where f = (b′)−1. After substituting gei , g
n
i and (g
n
i )
′ [which equals −θi/γi] into
(8) and setting β′ (wi) = wi one obtains
θi [(γi − 1)− θiwi] = γiwi.
It thus follows immediately that
wni =
θi (γi − 1)
γi − θ
2
i
(22)
and
∂wni
∂θi
=
(γi − 1)
(
γi + θ
2
i
)
γi − θ
2
i
. (23)
We also note that
gei (w
n
i ) =
γi
(
2− θ2i
)
− θ2i
γi
(
γi − θ
2
i
) and gni (wni ) = 1− θ2i
γi − θ
2
i
. (24)
After substituting (22) to (24) into (9), setting dθf = −dθ = −dθm (where dθ > 0)
and evaluating the resulting expression at θf = θm = θ˜, the desired condition
[which is stated in the lemma] now follows immediately.
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Proof of Proposition 2:
It is readily checked that the right-hand side of (10) is positive. Clearly γf − θ˜
2
<
γf − θ˜
2
because γf < γm by Assumption 2. Furthermore, θ˜
(
γf − 1
) (
γˆ − γf
)
>
θ˜
(
γf − 1
) (
γˆ − γf
)
because
(
γf + γm
) (
γf − γm
)
> 4
(
γf − γm
)
by Assumption 2
and the additional assumption that γi2 > 1 (i = f, m). As a result, aggregate house-
hold welfare is unambiguously higher with discriminatory labor market practices
compared to the non-discrimination benchmark.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The Nash bargained equilibrium payoff to i is given by uNi = (W
N + dNi − d
N
j )/2,
where WN is defined in (20) and where
dNi = θiw
n
i (1− g
n
i ) + g
n
i + g
n
j − γib (g
n
i )− β (w
n
i ) . (25)
Consider the case of discrimination for which dθf = −dθ < 0 < dθ = dθm, with fe-
male market opportunities reduced and male market opportunities raised compared
to the non-discrimination benchmark. Notice that changes in the (Nash bargained)
equilibrium payoffs uNf and u
N
m depend on how changes in θf and θm affect (i) aggre-
gate household welfare W N [see Lemma 1], and (ii) the intra-household bargaining
positions df − dm and dm − df . To derive the latter, we take the total differential
of df − dm, recalling that g
n
i = g
n
i (w
n
i , θi) and w
n
i = w
n
i (θi):
d (·) =
[
wnf
(
1− gnf
)
+
1
2
[
θf
(
gef − g
n
f
)
−
(
gnf
)
′
] ∂wnf
∂θf
−
∂gnf
∂θf
]
dθf
+
[
wnm (1− g
n
m) +
1
2
[
θm (g
e
m − g
n
m)− (g
n
m)
′
] ∂wnm
∂θm
−
∂gnm
∂θm
]
dθm, (26)
where
∂gnf
∂θf
= −
wnf
γfb
′′(gnf )
< 0 and
∂gnm
∂θm
= −
wnm
γmb
′′(gnm)
< 0.
After combining (9) and (26), one obtains
2(duNf ) =
 >0wnf (2− gef − gnf )−
<0
∂gnf
∂θf
 <0dθf−
 >0wnm (gem − gnm)− <02 (gnm)′ >0∂wnm∂θm −
<0
∂gnm
∂θm
 >0dθm < 0.
and
2(duNm) =
 >0wnm (2− gem − gnm)− <0∂gnm∂θm
 >0dθm−
 >0wnf (gef − gnf )− <02 (gnf )′
>0
∂wnf
∂θf
−
<0
∂gnf
∂θf
 <0dθf > 0.
The desired conclusion [which is stated in the proposition] now follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 5:
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Let
Li ≡
1
2
(uEf + u
E
m)− u
N
i
denote agent i’s (i = f, m) per-period loss in the punishment phase. Let
Gi ≡ u
D
i −
1
2
(uEf + u
E
m)
denote agent i’s (i = f, m) per-period gain from a unilateral (one-shot) deviation.
It follows from (18) that full cooperation is sustainable as long as
δ ≥ δ∗f = 1−
Lf
Lf + Gf
and δ ≥ δ∗f = 1−
Lm
Lm + Gm
. (27)
Consider the case of discrimination for which dθf = −dθ < 0 < dθ = dθm, with
female market opportunities reduced and male market opportunities raised com-
pared to the non-discrimination benchmark. After totally differentiating Lm, one
obtains
2 (dLm) =
wem [1− gem (wem)]− wnm [2− gem (wnm)− gnm (wnm)] + <0∂gnm∂θm
 >0dθm
+
 >0wef [1− gef (wef)] + >0wnm [gef (wnf )− gnf (wnf )]− <02 (gnf )′
>0
∂wnf
∂θf
−
<0
∂gnf
∂θf
 <0dθf .
We then note that the term wem [1− g
e
m (w
e
m)]−w
n
m [2− g
e
m (w
n
m)− g
n
m (w
n
m)] is un-
ambiguously negative.29 It thus follows that
dLm < 0. (28)
After totally differentiating Gm, we obtain
2 (dGm) =
wnm [2− gem (wnm)− gnm (wnm)]− wem [1− gem (wem)]− <0∂gnm∂θm
 >0dθm
−
 >0wem [1− gnf (wnf )]− <02 (gnf )′
>0
∂wnf
∂θf
−
<0
∂gnf
∂θf
 <0dθf .
Since the term wnm [2− g
e
m (w
n
m)− g
n
m (w
n
m)] − w
e
m [1− g
e
m (w
e
m)] is unambiguously
positive, it follows that
dGm > 0. (29)
From equation (28) it is clear that changes in θf and θm such that dθf < 0 < dθm
reduce m’s per-period loss in the punishment phase. From equation (29) it is clear
29This is because wem < w
n
m and g
e
m (w
e
m) > g
e
m (w
n
m) .
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that those changes increase m’s one-shot gain from a unilateral deviation from the
efficient household equilibrium. Equation (27) then implies that
dδ∗m > 0.
Hence male cooperation becomes more difficult to sustain within the marital re-
lationship. Along the lines of this proof, it is readily checked that dLf > 0 and
dGf < 0. Hence dδ
∗
f < 0, and female cooperation becomes less difficult to sustain
within the marital relationship.
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